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The proportion of informal or unprotected workers in developing countries is large. In
developing economies, the fraction of informal workers can be as high as 70% of total em-
ployment. For economies with signiﬁcant informal sectors, business cycle ﬂuctuations and
labor market policy interventions can have important e ects on the unemployment rate, and
also produce large reallocations of workers between "regulated" and "unregulated" jobs. In
this paper, we report the main cyclical patterns of one such labor market: Brazil. We then
use the empirical regularities found in the data to build, calibrate, and simulate a two-sector
search and matching labor market model, in which ﬁrms have the choice of hiring workers
formally or informally. We ﬁnd that our model, built in the spirit of traditional search and
matching models, can explain well most of the cyclical properties found in the data. We also
show that government policies that decrease the cost of formal jobs, or increase the cost of
informality, raise the share of formal employment while reducing unemployment.
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The coexistence of formal and informal jobs in developing economies has attracted the attention
of researches and policymakers over the last ﬁfty years. It is estimated that between 30% to
70% of the labor force in developing countries is employed in informal jobs.1 There is a vast
literature which seeks to understand why there are large informal sectors in these countries, and
the implications for the rest of the economy.2 However, there has been little attention given to
understanding the ﬂows in and out of unemployment in economies with informal jobs. Due to
the existence of large informal sectors, we would expect that the labor markets in these countries
display cyclical worker ﬂow patterns di erent from those in the developed world.3
The aim of this paper is to understand, both empirically and theoretically, the way labor
markets in economies with large informal sectors respond to cyclical ﬂuctuations and government
policies. To that end, we document the basic cyclical labor market facts for a country that has
attracted a fair amount of attention in the empirical literature, Brazil, a middle-income country
with a large informal sector. We then build, calibrate, and simulate a model to try to account
for these empirical facts. Finally, we use this theoretical framework to assess the e ects of
government policies on the labor market ﬂows and the rates of unemployment and formality.
In Brazil, where labor force surveys allow a clear distinction between formal and informal
workers, the share of informality ranges from 35% to 45% of total employment in the 1980s
and 1990s. In this period, the unemployment rate remains at an average level of 5.5%, low
compared to some OECD countries. The data also shows that, in terms of cyclical ﬂuctuations,
the unemployment rate is strongly countercyclical, whereas the share of formal employment is
procyclical. Labor market ﬂows also show marked patterns. We ﬁnd that separations from both
formal and informal jobs are countercyclical, especially from informal jobs. The job-ﬁnding rate
of formal jobs, both from unemployment and directly from informal jobs, is strongly procyclical,
while accessions towards informal jobs are much less volatile and do not show such a strong
cyclical pattern. We perform an unemployment accounting exercise which shows two important
facts: First, almost 80% of the cyclical ﬂuctuations in unemployment can be attributed to changes
in the job separations rates. And second, variations in the rate at which workers transition to
formality, from unemployment and directly from informal jobs, can account for more than 80%
of all the cyclical ﬂuctuations in the share of formal employment.
Guided by the previous evidence, this paper presents a model in the style of the search
and matching literature. We incorporate three main features: First, due to the importance
of the ﬂuctuations of job separations, we anchor our model in the spirit of the endogenous
job destruction literature, such as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Second, we endogenize
1See Hart (1973), de Soto (1989), and Schneider and Enste (2000) for extensive reviews of the causes and
consequences of this type of employment. See also Djankov et al. (2002) and Schneider (2003) for detailed
cross-country estimates of the size of the informal economy for developed and developing countries.
2See Fields (2006) for an extensive review of multisectoral models with informal jobs.
3See Bosch and Maloney (2008) and Hoek (2002) for comprehensive microeconometric studies of these ﬂows
for Brazil and Mexico.
1the decision of the ﬁrm to hire formal or informal workers in order to explain the di erent
behaviour of the job-ﬁnding rates of formal and informal jobs. We assume that ﬁrms post
"generic" vacancies and, when the worker arrives, they decide whether to establish a formal or
an informal relationship. The type of contract chosen depends on the quality of the match and
the trade-o s between formal and informal employment. Formal contracts can fully exploit the
productivity of the match at the cost of abiding with labor regulations. Informal contracts avoid
labor regulations, but ﬁrms face a penalty if the government detects them. The third important
feature of the model is that, given the quantitative importance of direct ﬂows from informal to
formal jobs, we allow for direct transitions from informal into formal employment.
The model highlights the substitutability between formal and informal contracts within simi-
lar job types. The assumption that vacancies posted by ﬁrms can be ﬁlled formally or informally
seeks to reﬂect the idea that jobs are not intrinsically formal or informal. The motivation for
modelling this margin is rooted in the fact that most of the changes in the share of formal
employment occurs within industries, occupations, and population groups. This suggests that
reallocation of labor from formal industries/occupations towards informal industries/occupations
is not the main driving force behind changes in the proportion of formal jobs.
We calibrate the model to match basic facts of the Brazilian economy, simulate it, and show
that the model does a good job at reproducing the empirical correlations and elasticities of the
main variables. The intuition is as follows: As is standard in search and matching models,
expansions, or times of positive productivity shocks, foster vacancy creation. This increases the
number of meetings between ﬁrms and workers, the so-called meeting e ect. Our model has
an extra e ect: In good times, ﬁrms expand the use of formal contracts, since these types of
contracts allow them to take more advantage of the increase in productivity. This is the so-called
o er e ect. These two e ects reinforce each other and produce an increase in the job-ﬁnding
rate for formal jobs. At the same time, we may observe an increase or a decrease in the ﬁnding
rate for informal jobs, since the two e ects act diametrically, which explains the relatively low
volatility of this rate in the data. Given the higher proﬁts of ﬁrms during booms, destruction of
both types of jobs drops. In all, after a positive productivity shock, there is more job creation
and less job destruction, which explains the countercyclicality of the unemployment rate. The
procyclicality of the share of formal employment in the model depends, however, on the relative
strengths of job creation and job destruction in each sector of employment. We show that under
a reasonable parametrization, the model can also reproduce the procyclicality of the share of
formal employment.
Our theoretical model provides a framework for studying the e ects of policy changes on
the allocation of workers in developing countries. We examine the impact of changes in ﬁve
labor market policies: hiring costs, ﬁring costs, payroll taxes, monitoring of the informal sector
and ﬁnes to informal ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that policies that reduce the cost of formality, or those that
increase the cost of informality, produce an increase in the share of formal employment while also
reducing unemployment. We show that these interventions a ect the labor market not only by
2modifying the creation of vacancies and the destruction of jobs, but also by changing the ﬁrm’s
hiring standards. This generates a reallocation between formal and informal jobs which has
non-neutral e ects on the unemployment rate, since informal jobs report much higher separation
rates.
We are not the ﬁrst to analyze the existence of informal employment in a model with search
frictions and to use it to understand the impact of policies in the labor market. There is a growing
theoretical literature that explores models through which policy can alter the equilibrium in these
labor markets. Albrecht et al. (2006) argue that workers’ productivity is the major determinant
of participation in the informal sector. They use a model with heterogeneous workers, and
show that the emergence of informal jobs is rooted in the decision of low-productivity workers
to become informally self-employed. Other models assume the exogenous existence of both
formal and informal ﬁrms posting vacancies. In these models, heterogeneous workers direct their
searches towards one of the two types of ﬁrms according to their moral costs of operating in the
informal sector (Fugazza and Jaques, 2002, and Kolm and Larsen, 2002), to worker’s education
(Kolm and Larsen, 2004), or to productivity di erences (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006).4 Other
types of models endogenize the ﬁrm’s choice. Kugler (1999) assumes that ﬁrms sort themselves
into formal or informal statuses according to their ex-ante productivity levels, and workers are
matched randomly into formal and informal ﬁrms. Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) and Bosch
(2004) build occupational choice models. In these models, agents are allowed to decide between
becoming formal entrepreneurs, informal entrepreneurs, or workers in search of a jobs. Zenou
(2008), considers a model where the formal sector is subject to search frictions, whereas the
informal market is competitive. He then analyzes the impact of various policies on the size of the
formal sector and the equilibrium wages. However, due to the lack of data, this growing body
of literature has lacked the empirical scrutiny that its counterpart in developed countries has
received (see Shimer, 2005). The contribution of this paper is to build a search and matching
model that is consistent with the empirical regularities found in developing countries. This
provides a more solid base for the assessment of policy interventions in these labor markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the empirical
evidence on worker ﬂows for Brazil. Section 3 presents the steady state model and the equilibrium
in the stochastic environment. Section 4 shows the calibration of the model parameters. Section
5 shows the simulation results and compares them with the empirical evidence of Section 2.
Section 6 describes the policy experiments. Finally, section 7 summarizes and concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
We focus our empirical analysis on Brazil, where detailed labor force surveys allow us to compute
with precision not only the proportion of informal employment in the economy, but also the gross
4Alternatively, Bouev (2002) suggests that workers may search randomly.
3movements of workers between employment statuses.5
It is widely accepted that formal workers are those working in ﬁrms licensed with the gov-
ernment and conforming to tax and labor laws, including minimum wage directives, pension and
health insurance beneﬁts for employees, workplace standards of safety, etc. Firms employing
informal workers, on the contrary, are largely de-linked from state institutions and obligations,
and their employees are not covered by formal labor protections. As is standard in the literature,
we deﬁne informal employment as the informal micro-entrepreneurs and those salaried workers
whose employers do not comply with social security regulations. Using the Brazilian labor survey
from 1987 to 2001 (Pesquisa Mensual de Emprego, PME), we identify as informal employment
those self-employed workers who are not professionals or technicians, and salaried workers who
are not in possession of a work-card or “carteira de trabalho” that entitles them to labor rights
and beneﬁts.6 In what follows, we explain the main facts emerging from the data in Brazil
between the ﬁrst quarter of 1983 to last quarter of 2001.
Figure 1(a) shows the two main indicators of the functioning of the Brazilian labor market,
the unemployment rate, u, and the share of formal employment over total employment,  . We can
see that the unemployment rate is relatively low compared to OECD countries. Despite major
macroeconomic shocks during the 1980’s and 1990’s, the unemployment rate never increased
above 8%. Additionally, informality as a share of total employment comprises a substantial part
of total employment, between 35%-45%. We can observe in Table 1 that, consistent with the
evidence presented in Figure 1(a), the unemployment rate is strongly countercyclical, with a
cross correlation with output of -0.83. Furthermore, it is 5.41 times as volatile as output. The
share of formal employment is procyclical and around half as volatile as output.7 To obtain
further insight into the evolution of these two stocks, it is useful to analyze the ﬂows of workers
and the transition probabilities between the di erent states.8
Taking advantage of the panel dimension of the PME, we compute the monthly transition
probabilities among our three employment states by averaging the number of transitions from
one state to another over the stock of the sector of origin. We then take logs, seasonally adjust
the result, take quarterly averages of those probabilities, and detrend the series using an HP
ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 1600. Figures 1(b) - 1(d) show the evolution of the levels of
transition probabilities among employment states; the cyclical properties of the series and its
correlation with output can be found in Table 1. Several facts merit attention.
First, the probability with which workers ﬁnd formal jobs from unemployment, the job-
5See Appendix A for details on the data. Empirical studies that analyze the Mexican economy, i.e. Bosch and
Maloney (2008), ﬁnd that the cyclical patterns explained here for Brazil are also extensible, for the most part, to
Mexico.
6See Appendix A for details. Also for a detailed discussion on the issues around the deﬁnition of informal
workers in Brazil see Bosch and Maloney (2008), Hoek (2002) and Henley et al. (2006)
7Since the share of formality and informality add up to one, the correlation of these two variables with output
is of the same magnitude, but opposite sign.
8The transition probabilities presented in Figure 1 correspond to quarterly averages of monthly transitions
rates. Throughout the paper we refer to them as the job-ﬁnding and job separation rates, although technically
they correspond to discrete transition probabilities. The continuous transition rates exhibit exactly the same
cyclical pattern. See Bosch and Maloney (2006) and Bosch et al. (2006) for details.
4ﬁnding rate for formal jobs JFRf, is strongly procyclical, whereas that for informal jobs, JFRi,
is only weakly procyclical, with cross-correlations with output of 0.74 and 0.24, respectively.
Furthermore, the job-ﬁnding rate for formal jobs is more volatile than that for informal jobs,
around 3 times more variable. In terms of elasticities, we ﬁnd that an increase in the Brazilian
output of 1% increases the job-ﬁnding rate for formal jobs by 3.93%, but that for informal jobs
by 10 times less. This evidence suggests a much higher responsiveness in the ﬁnding rate for
formal jobs than that for informal ones.
Second, the probability of losing a job, the job separation rates JSRf and JSRi, are counter-
cyclical for both types of jobs. That is, in bad times there is a higher probability of losing a job.
However, the countercyclicality is substantially higher for informal jobs than for formal ones,
with cross-correlations with output of -0.75 and -0.28, respectively. Furthermore, the volatility
of the job separation rate for informal jobs is also higher. Indeed, the elasticity with respect to
output of the job separation rate for informal jobs is more than 4 times higher than that for
formal jobs, -4.41 vs -1.01. However, note that despite the large increases in the job separation
rate for informal jobs during recessions, the share of formal employment decreases in downturns.
Finally, in terms of direct transitions between informality and formality, we ﬁnd that the
probability of transitioning from an informal job to a formal job, JJi f, is, as expected, strongly
procyclical. However, the direct transition rate to formal jobs is less volatile than the transition
rate from unemployment. Similarly, the elasticity with respect to output is 1.72, around half as
large as the elasticity of the ﬂow from unemployment into formal jobs. The opposite ﬂow, from
formal jobs to informal jobs, JJf i, is also procyclical, although less volatile than the ﬂow from
informal to formal jobs.
The previous evidence suggests that changes in unemployment and the share of formality
seem to be explained by changes in the access to formal jobs, both from unemployment and in-
formal jobs, and changes in the separation rate for informal jobs, rather than from changes in the
outﬂows from formal employment. In order to quantify the relative contributions of each ﬂow,
we perform an unemployment accounting exercise, in the spirit of other papers in the literature
(see Fujita and Ramey, 2008, and Shimer, 2007 for details). The exercise consists of three steps:
First, we simulate the steady-state unemployment rate and the share of formal employment for
each period using the empirical ﬂows between states from the previous period.9 Second, we sim-
ulate the counterfactual unemployment rates and the share of formal employment when each of
the 6 possible ﬂows in our data is allowed to vary individually. Third, we compute the covariance
between the detrended counterfactual series and the the detrended unemployment rate and share
of formal employment.10 Table 2 shows this set of covariances as a proportion of the variance of
the detrended steady-state unemployment rate and share of formal employment. These covari-
ances can be interpreted as the contribution of the variability of a particular ﬂow to the total
9This ﬁrst step delivers a very good approximation of both series. The cross correlation between the steady state
unemployment rate and the actual series is 0.95. The simulation of the steady state share of formal employment
is less accurate with a cross correlation of 0.85.
10The series are detrended using the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 1600.
5cyclical variability of either the unemployment rate or the share of formal employment.11 Two
main lessons can be drawn from this exercise. First, the volatility of unemployment is explained
in great part by changes in the job separation rate, especially for informal jobs. Approximately,
71% of unemployment variability is attributable to changes in the job separation rate for infor-
mal jobs. The contribution of the job-ﬁnding rate is 21%, and it is almost fully accounted for
by changes in the job-ﬁnding rate for formal jobs (16%). And second, ﬂuctuations in the share
of formal jobs are mostly due to changes in the probability of transiting towards formality from
informality, 82%, with a small fraction due to swings in the job-ﬁnding rate for informal jobs,
11%.12
In summary, the empirical evidence presented above tells us that (i) unemployment and the
share of informality are countercyclical; (ii) job-ﬁnding rates are procyclical, but substantially
more volatile into formal jobs; (iii) job separation rates are countercyclical, and more variable
from informal employment; (iv) direct transitions from informality into formality are procyclical,
and (v) the cyclical variability of unemployment is mostly explained by movements in the sepa-
ration rate for informal workers, while the volatility of the formal employment share is explained
by changes in transition rate from informal to formal jobs.
In the following section we build a model to account for these facts, and use it to analyze the
extent to which the cyclical patterns in the ﬂows and stock variables are explained by aggregate
productivity movements, and to assess policy interventions.
3 The Model
The model is a continuous time search and matching labor market model. In light of the evidence
presented above, we introduce three key features in the model. First, in order to account for
the existence of formal and informal jobs in the labor market, we introduce a ﬁrm-internal
decision between two types of contract, formal and informal. Second, given the quantitative
importance of the job separation rate in unemployment volatility, we build the model in the
spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), with endogenous job separations. Third, we allow for
direct transitions from informal into formal jobs to capture the cyclical variability in the share
of formal employment.
As in the standard search and matching model, we assume that ﬁrms and workers try to meet
in the labor market and form employment relationships, which are composed of one ﬁrm and
one worker. Matches occur randomly and according to a matching function m = m(u,v), where
u is the total number of unemployed workers and v the number of vacancies. The matching
11As noted by Fujita and Ramey (2007), the decomposition is not an exact one, and hence the sum of the
contributions does not necessarily add up to one. However, we ﬁnd that it is a very good approximation of both
the unemployment and the share of formal employment series.
12This is consistent with evidence presented by Bosch and Maloney (2008) for Mexico and Brazil. In that case,
the authors consider the contributions of ﬂows between ﬁve employment states, including out of the labor force
and two sectors of informality. Although the contributions are quantitatively di erent, qualitatively the results
are the same.
6technology is homogeneous of degree one, and increasing and concave in both arguments. A
ﬁrm having a vacancy matches with an unemployed worker according to a Poisson process with
arrival rate q ( )=m(u,v)/v, where   = v
u is the market tightness of the economy. Similarly,
the arrival rate of vacancies for workers is q ( )=m(u,v)/u.
Workers are ex-ante identical, but when a match is formed, the productivity of the em-
ployment relationship is revealed and heterogeneity arises. This productivity is composed of
an aggregate component, p, which is common to all ﬁrms, and an idiosyncratic term,  , which







Depending on the productivity level, the ﬁrm decides whether to o er a formal or an informal
contract. Firms involved in formal productive matches incur the following costs associated with
government regulations: payment of a hiring cost, c, upon signing the contract; payroll taxes,
where the marginal tax rate is  ; and payment of a ﬁring cost, F, when the formal employment
relationship is ﬁnished. If the ﬁrm chooses to hire the worker as an informal employee, it does
not have the burden of the aforesaid costs. However, evading them implies that it can only take
advantage of a fraction     (0,1) of the productivity of the match. This assumption is based
on microeconometric analysis of labor markets with large informal sectors, which shows that
there is a substantial unexplained wage gap (20% to 30%) between formal and informal workers,
even after controlling for observables.13 We also assume that if an informal ﬁrm is discovered
by the government, which occurs according to a Poisson process with arrival rate  , it is forced
to terminate the match and to pay a ﬁne  . All of these costs to formal and informal ﬁrms are
paid to the government and are used in activities outside of the model.
During an employment relationship, ongoing formal and informal matches draw new idiosyn-
cratic productivity levels according to a Poisson process with arrival rates  f and  i, respec-







  [0,1]. With the new realization of the idiosyncratic productivity, ﬁrms and
workers decide whether to continue with the current match, to change the type of contract, or to
terminate it. While it is possible that formal ﬁrms break a formal contract and start an informal
employment relationship with the same worker, we abstract this case from our model. The main
reason is that quantitatively, this ﬂow is not crucial to explain the ﬂuctuations of unemployment
or the share of formal employment.
Let us now explain the problem of ﬁrms and workers in more detail.
3.1 Problem of the Firm
Let V be the present discounted value of posting a vacancy for a ﬁrm. Similarly, let Jl
f ( ) and
Ji ( ) represent the value for a ﬁrm of occupied formal and informal jobs respectively, where
l  {n,o} identiﬁes the new and ongoing formal matches.
13See Gonzaga (2003)and Almeida and Carneiro (2005) for papers referring to the productivity di erential
between formal and informal jobs in Brazil; see also Marcoullier et al. (1997) for measures of the informal wage
gap in Mexico, El Salvador, and Peru.
7Given the environment explained previously, the value for a ﬁrm of posting a vacancy is:
rV =  k + q( )
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The interpretation of equation (1) is as follows: Vacancies have a ﬂow cost of k for being
opened, and they meet potential employees at a rate q( ). If matched with a worker, the id-
iosyncratic productivity,  , is revealed and the ﬁrm faces three choices. First, it can formalize
the relationship, in which case the ﬁrm enjoys a value of Jn
f ( ), but has to pay the hiring cost,
c. Second, the ﬁrm can avoid regulations by hiring the worker informally, and obtain a value
of Ji( ). Finally, the ﬁrm may prefer to keep searching and retain the vacancy. However, we
assume that the distribution of initial productivities is such that the worst initial idiosyncratic
productivity realization is high enough to generate match formation.14
The introduction of ﬁring costs in formal jobs gives rise to two di erent value functions
for occupied jobs. Jn
f ( ) is the value for a ﬁrm to form a new employment relationship with
idiosyncratic productivity  . These new matches di er from ongoing ones, whose value is Jo
f( ),
in the wages payed. The reason is that new matches are not subject to the ﬁring cost should
a productive relationship not be formed15. The value for a ﬁlled formal ﬁrm with idiosyncratic
productivity   is:
rJl
f ( )=p +     (1 +  )wl
f ( )+ f
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(2)
An occupied formal ﬁrm produces output as the combination of the general and match speciﬁc
idiosyncratic productivity, p, and  , respectively. It pays wages, wl
f ( ), and pays payroll taxes,
whose marginal rate is  . It draws a new idiosyncratic productivity    according to a Poisson
process with arrival rate  f, and then decides whether to continue the match, which has a value
of Jo
f (  ), or to dissolve it. If it chooses the latter, it becomes a vacant ﬁrm after paying the
ﬁring cost F.
Similarly, we can describe the value of an informally ﬁlled ﬁrm as:
rJi ( )=  (p +  ) wi ( )+ i
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(3)
The value for a ﬁlled job for an informal ﬁrm is composed of the current ﬂow output net of
wages and the continuation value. As explained before, informal jobs are less productive than
formal ones, since  < 1, but on the other hand they avoid paying taxes. The arrival rate of new
14An earlier version of this paper relaxed this assumption and allowed matches to be discarded if the initial
idiosyncratic productivity was too low. In such a scenario, there is an additional threshold that determines
match formation, which coincides with that determining job separation of informal workers. The results of this
alternative speciﬁcation are not qualitatively di erent from those presented here.
15See Chapter 9 of Pissarides (2000) for a discussion on the di erences between new and ongoing matches in
the presence of ﬁring costs.
8idiosyncratic productivities is  i, and after drawing the new level,   , the ﬁrm chooses whether to
pay the hiring cost and formalize the relationship, to remain informal, or to dissolve the match
and create a vacancy. It is also possible that the informal job gets discovered, which happens
according to a Poisson process with arrival rate  , in which case the match is forced to dissolve
and the ﬁrm forced to pay a ﬁne,  .
3.2 Problem of the Worker
The value functions for the workers are given by
rU = b +  q( )
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The interpretation of equations (4) to (6) is similar to that of the problem of the ﬁrm. Let
U represent the present discounted value of an unemployed worker. While searching, the worker
gets a ﬂow value of b. He ﬁnds jobs at a rate  q( ), and depending on the type of contract o ered
by the ﬁrm, he enjoys the value of a new formal job Wn
f ( ), or that of an informal job, Wi( ).
Once the worker is employed, the value of which is represented in equations (5) and (6), he gets
paid a wage depending on the type of contract, formal or informal, and the productivity of the
match. The idiosyncratic productivity changes with time, and when it does, the worker decides
whether it is beneﬁcial for him to continue working for the ﬁrm with the same type of contract
as before, to try to change it (if he is currently an informal worker), or to become unemployed
and search for another job. Informal workers are also subject to forced separation from the ﬁrm
if they are discovered by the government.
3.3 Surplus and Wages
The surplus of a match is deﬁned as the gain by ﬁrm and worker of forming a productive match
after netting their losses. The existence of hiring and ﬁring costs generates a di erence in the
wages of new and already established formal relationships, which is reﬂected in di erent surpluses.
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Following the literature, when a ﬁrm and a worker ﬁrst meet, or when an idiosyncratic
9shock arrives, they choose the wages as the Nash solution to a bargain problem, where   is
the bargaining power of the worker. The optimal conditions for wage determination deliver the
surplus sharing rules, where ﬁrm and worker get a constant fraction of the surplus generated by
the match. However, due to the existence of payroll taxes, the formal sector sharing rules di er
from the standard ones, in which the worker gets a share of the surplus equal to his bargaining
power. The following equations summarize the rules to divide the surplus:
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Equations (10) to (12) highlight a well-known fact of Nash bargaining. Firms and workers always
agree on the type of contract, as well as when to destroy the match. From the hiring point of view,
ﬁrms are willing to hire a worker formally as long as Jn
f ( )   c > Ji ( ) and Jn
f ( )   c   V> 0,
which necessarily implies that Wn
f ( ) >W i ( ) and Wn
f ( ) >U. Similarly, the ﬁrm chooses an
informal contract if Jn
f ( )   c < Ji ( ) and Ji ( )   V> 0.
3.4 Steady State Equilibrium
We are now ready to characterize the steady-state equilibrium of the model. This equilibrium
can be reduced to four equations on four variables,  ,  R,  df and  di. The four conditions
that determine the equilibrium are: The job creation equation; the condition which reﬂects
the formality/informality choice for the ﬁrm; and the job destruction equations for formal and
informal jobs.16
The ﬁrst equation states that the creation of vacancies is driven by the free entry of ﬁrms in
the labor market. This implies that in equilibrium, ﬁrms post vacancies to the point at which
posting an extra vacancy has a present discounted value of zero, that is, V =0 . Using this
condition, we obtain the following equation:
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(13)
This condition equates the expected cost of the vacancy to its expected proﬁt, and determines
the equilibrium market tightness.
The second condition relates to the hiring decision of the ﬁrm. We deﬁne  R as the level of
idiosyncratic productivity that makes the ﬁrm indi erent between hiring the worker formally or
informally. This can be expressed as
Jn
f ( R)   c = Ji ( R), (14)
16For the derivations of the equilibrium conditions please refer to Appendix B.
10which after some algebra delivers the following equation
 R =
(r +  f)(r +  i +  )(c + F)+( r +  i +  ) df     (r +  f) di
r +  i +       (r +  f)
. (15)
The last two conditions determine the job separation threshold of formal jobs, equation (16),
and informal jobs, equation (17). The threshold  df represents the productivity level that makes
an ongoing formal job unproﬁtable. Similarly, the job separation threshold of informal jobs is






+ F =0 , (16)
Ji ( di)=0 . (17)
Their explicit formulations are:
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where
 =    q ( )
   R
 G
min
  (      di)
r +  i +  
dG
 
   
. (20)
  captures the part of the outside option of the worker associated with the fact that informal
contracts are not subject to taxation. More speciﬁcally, since the informal ﬁrm evades taxes,
the surplus of an informal match has an extra beneﬁt associated with this tax savings. This is
recognized by the unemployed worker and captured in the expected value of future employment.
The increase in the outside option of the worker lowers the surplus of every match and raises the
minimum productivity that makes the matches proﬁtable.
The job destruction thresholds are both increasing in the market tightness, the ﬂow value
of unemployment, and the term  , since all of these increase the outside option of the worker
and reduce the surplus. They are decreasing in the aggregate productivity and the expected
future proﬁts of continuing the match, since, if either of these increase, the surplus of the match
increases and the incentive to separate drops.
It is easy to show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in this model. Higher
  increases the left-hand side of equation (13), since more vacancies per unemployed worker
increases waiting time for ﬁrms. Furthermore, it lowers the right-hand side of equation (13),
as both separation thresholds depend positively on  , and in equilibrium, the formal/informal
11threshold,  R, does not a ect the expected proﬁts from posting a vacancy due to the envelope
condition. Hence, there is a unique value of   that satisﬁes equation (13).
The equilibrium is depicted in Figure 2. This ﬁgure shows the equilibrium in the  R- ,17 and
 df, di-  spaces. Panel (b) shows how equations (13) and (15) determine the equilibrium values
of  R and  . Given the equilibrium value of  , Panel (c) displays the equilibrium for  df and  di.
Once the equilibrium values of the market tightness and the thresholds are obtained, we
can retrieve the steady state values of unemployment and formal and informal employment.






nf +(  iH ( di)+ )ni
 q ( )
, (21)
nf =
 q ( )[1   G( R)]u +  i [1   H ( R)]ni
 fH ( df )
, (22)
ni =1  nf   u. (23)
The steady state level of unemployment is determined by the ﬂows in and out of that state. Flows





and  iH ( di)+  respectively. The rates at which workers ﬂow out of unemployment
can be divided in two: The job-ﬁnding rate for formal jobs, which is given by
JFRf =  q ( )[1   G( R)], (24)
and the job-ﬁnding rate for informal jobs, given by
JFRi =  q ( )G( R). (25)
Informal jobs are converted into formal ones if the informal ﬁrm draws a high enough idiosyncratic
productivity, which occurs at rate  i [1   H ( R)].
Now that we have explained the steady state of the model, and have established the existence
and uniqueness of such equilibrium, we are ready to modify the model to account for aggregate
shocks. Such aggregate stochastic movements deliver cyclical ﬂuctuations in the model, which we
can use to compare with those observed in the data and hence test the model’s performance18.
17In the representation of the equilibrium in Figure 2, we have assumed a positive relationship between  R and
 , since that is the relationship we observe in the calibrated model below. Theoretically, this is not necessarily the
case, since it depends on the magnitudes of
  df
   and
  di
   . However, the slope of this curve does not qualitatively
alter the derivation of the equilibrium.
18For the purpose of concision, we have not included here the comparative statics for the model. This exercise
can be found in Appendix C for a simpler version of the model with no informal upgrading and payroll taxes.
Such a comparative statics exercise provides intuition for the behavior of the steady state of the model following
changes in aggregate productivities, and helps to understand the results of the stochastic simulations of the model.
123.5 Stochastic Equilibrium
We now generalize the previous model to incorporate stochastic movements in aggregate pro-
ductivity. The stochastic equilibrium of the model is as the steady state one, except that the
job separations equations (18) and (19) are altered due to the incorporation of the aggregate
shock. These two equations di er from their steady state counterparts since when faced with
aggregate productivity shocks, ﬁrms and workers have to decide hirings and separations, taking
into account the probability that the aggregate state of the economy may change. The separation
equations in this stochastic environment are
 df (p)= p + (1 +  )b   rF +
 k (p)
1    
+     f




   +  df (p)
 
(r +  f + µ)
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   f, (26)
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   +  df(p)
r +  f + µ




   
   i, (27)
where   is as in equation (20); µ represents the arrival rate of an aggregate shock; S (p |p) is the
conditional distribution of the next state of the economy p , given that we are in p; and  f and
 i are the option values generated by the fact that there are ﬂuctuations in the aggregate state
p, and are described by the following equations:





































In the presence of aggregate shocks, the law of motion of unemployment, and formal and
informal employment are also di erent. The reason is that upon the arrival of a negative aggre-
gate shock, some jobs, those between the two separation thresholds, are immediately destroyed.
Similarly, if a good shock arrives, some informal jobs are immediately upgraded to formal jobs.
Let nf( ) be the number of formal workers with idiosyncratic productivity   at the beginning
of the current period. Workers ﬂow out of that pool when they update their idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity, which occurs at rate  f. New workers ﬂow into the pool at di erent rates depending
on their origin. From the formal employment pool, which overall has nf workers, the inﬂow rate
is  f
 H( )
   ; from the pool of informal workers, which contains ni workers, these ﬂow in at rate
 i
 H( )
   as long as  >  R; and from the unemployment pool, which counts u workers, these ﬂow
13in at rate  q( )
 G( )
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Note that when simulating the model in this stochastic environment, we need to pay particular
attention to two groups of workers whose status may change due to an aggregate productivity
change, even when they do not vary their idiosyncratic productivity. These two groups are: First,
formal and informal workers whose jobs are destroyed due to a negative aggregate technology
shock; and second, those informal workers who may be immediately upgraded after a positive
aggregate productivity shock.
4 Calibration
To perform the model simulations presented in the following section, we need to choose the forms
of the di erent functions and processes, and assign values for the parameters in the model. The
functional forms are chosen following other related studies in the literature. A subset of the
parameters are ﬁxed according to what has become standard in the literature, and the remaining
parameters are calibrated to match the long-run empirical evidence of Brazil between 1983q1 to
2001q4, which would correspond to the steady state of the model. A summary of the parameter
values can be found in Table 4. Let us now explain the calibration procedure in detail.
The time period of the simulation is one quarter. We set the interest rate to r =0 .019,
which is the quarterly average from 1980 to 2001 of the government primary rate discounted by
the consumer price index (see Kanczuk, 2004 for details). The matching function is assumed
to be Cobb-Douglas, m =  u v1  , with unemployment elasticity   =0 .5, which is in the
lower bound of the estimates from Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). The scaling parameter,
 , is calibrated jointly with other model parameters, as will be discussed later. Following the
literature, we assume that the bargaining power of workers internalizes the search externalities,
that is,   =0 .5.
The productivity wedge between formal and informal jobs,  , the monitoring rate,  , and
the penalty for detection,  , summarize the costs of employing informal labor. We estimate  
using the 2001 PME. We regress the log of wages on a number of observables including personal
characteristics of the workers, industry and occupational dummies, and a dummy for informal
status. This latter dummy gives a value of around 0.81. We set   =0 .81, which implies that
14informal contracts are 81% as productive as formal contracts. This is consistent with the ﬁndings
of Marcouiller et al. (1997) for other Latin American countries, such as El Salvador and Peru.
There is very little evidence as to how intensively the government monitors the labor market in
search of informal jobs. Almeida and Carneiro (2005) study the impact of the enforcement of
regulations in a ﬁrm’s performance using the Investment Climate Survey collected by the World
Bank in a set of Brazilian manufacturing ﬁrms. They report that, in their sample of 1641 ﬁrms,
around 0.5% received some kind of labor regulations related ﬁne. We use this estimate and set
the separation of informal jobs due to monitoring to   =0 .005. The calibration of   is done
jointly with other model parameters, and is explained later.
The Doing Business database at the World Bank provides estimates of the costs of formality
in Brazil. The non-wage labor costs in Brazil are 37.3% of formal wages. We use this as a proxy
for the payroll taxes, and set   =0 .37. Furthermore, ﬁrms have to spend, on average, around 1
day to register and formalize a job. We take this as a proxy for the output forgone by a formal
match due to hiring costs, and since the time period is one quarter, or 90 days, we set c =1 /90.
Calibration of the ﬂow value of unemployment, b, has attracted signiﬁcant attention in the
U.S. literature. This parameter captures elements such as the value of leisure, unemployment
beneﬁts, home production, and the disutility of work. Shimer (2005) sets it to 0.4, whereas
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) use a value of 0.955. We choose b to be between these two
extreme cases, and set it to b =0 .6. Since, as expected, the volatility of the model changes with
the value of this parameter, we show how our results change when this parameter is varied.
The arrival rate of idiosyncratic shocks,  f and  i, are important parameters in the model. As
in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), these variables control the elasticity of the job separation
rate. In this case, the parameters are also crucial to determine the overall volatility of the
job-ﬁnding rate, since  R is a function of  df and  di. We set the arrival rate of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks to formal jobs,  f, to 0.08. This produces a volatility in the job separation
rate of formal jobs similar to that in the data. We set the equivalent rate for informal jobs,  i,
to 0.32, four times higher than its formal counterpart, which is approximately the ratio between
the elasticity of the separation rate of formal and informal jobs. Given the importance of these
two parameters, we study the response of the model to changes in their values thoroughly in the
next section.
We follow Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and assume that the dynamics of the aggregate
productivity are captured by a three state Markov process. Productivity, p, can take three
possible values, ¯ p z, ¯ p, and ¯ p+z, where the parameter z determines the range in the variation
of productivity around its mean, ¯ p. The transition probability between any two states is given
by  ij = µS (pi,p j), where
 ij =
 
   
 
 
    1        
  1   2  
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15Note that since the aggregate productivity changes are governed by the transition matrix  ij, we
do not need to specify either µ or S (pi,p j). Christiano (1990) shows that this speciﬁcation has
a Wold representation for p of the form p  =  p + (1    )¯ p +  . In the previous process,   is the




and   is the coe cient of kurtosis, which satisﬁes that   = 1 + 0.5 
 . We normalize ¯ p to unity,
and calibrate the remaining parameters of this process to match the cyclical behaviour of labor
productivity, measured as GDP per worker, for the Brazilian quarterly data in the period of
study. The ﬁrst order autocorrelation and standard deviation of labor productivity in the data
are   =0 .9475 and  v =0 .011. There are two degrees of freedom in selecting a parametrization
for the Markov process since it has four parameters:  ,  ,   and z. We follow Christiano (1990)
and eliminate those degrees of freedom by setting  =0 .0525 and the kurtosis parameter,  , to
be similar to that of a uniform distribution. Therefore, we obtain that  =0 .0525,   = 0.9475,
  =0 .025 and z =0 .05.
We assume that the idiosyncratic productivity, G( ) and H( ) distributions are uniform in
the range [ G
min,1] and [ H
min,1], respectively. Therefore, they take the forms
G( )=
     G
min
1    G
min
,H ( )=
     H
min
1    H
min
. (28)
The values of  G
min,  H
min are calibrated jointly with the steady state values of the endogenous
variables  ,  R,  di,  di, and the four remaining exogenous parameters in the model: The cost
of posting a vacancy, k, the ﬁring cost, F, the scaling parameter in the matching function,  ,
and the penalty for informal ﬁrms to get caught,  . The 10 values for these parameters and
endogenous variables are calibrated such that the steady state of the model matches the long-
term properties in the data. In particular, they satisfy the four steady state equilibrium equations
(15), (13), (26) and (27), and 6 moments: (i) the unemployment rate, 5.5%; (ii) the fraction of
new jobs that are informal, 70% in the data and G( R) in the model; (iii) the job-ﬁnding rate
for formal jobs, 30% in the data and    (1   G( R)) in the model; (iv) the net reallocation of
workers from informality to formality, 3.5% in the data and  i(1   H( R)) in the model19; (v)
the job separation rate of informal jobs, 10% in the data and  iH( di)+  in the model; (vi)
market tightness equal to unity,   =1 . To the best of our knowledge, there are no estimates of
the value of the market tightness in Brazil or any comparable economy, mainly due to the lack
of data on vacancies. However, as explained by Shimer (2005), the steady state value of   is of
little importance in the results, since varying it only implies a readjustment of the value of  ,
leaving everything else unchanged. The calibrated values of  G
min and  H
min are -0.11 and 0.59,
19In the data, an average of around 21% of workers in informal jobs transition to formal jobs within a quarter.
At the same time, 15% of formal workers transition from formal to informal jobs every quarter. This implies
that the net transfer rate from informality to formality is equivalent to 3.5% of existing informal jobs. Since
in the model we abstract from the ﬂow of workers from formal to informal jobs, an issue that is the focus of
another paper (Bosch and Esteban-Pretel, 2009), to properly match this net reallocation rate in our model we set
 i(1   H( R)) = 0.035.
16respectively20. The values for the remaining four parameters are   =1 , k =0 .63, F =1 .53, and
  =8 .41.
Given the previous parametrization, Table 5 reports the equilibrium results for the endoge-
nous variables in the three states of the aggregate shock.
5 Simulation Results
We simulate the model under the previous parametrization for 1000 quarters, and discard the
ﬁrst 927 periods. This leaves 73 quarters of simulated data, which is the same length as the
actual data from Brazil. We repeat this procedure 1000 times, and calculate the average of the
main statistics over the 1000 iterations. Table 6 reports the cross-correlations, volatilities, and
elasticities, all with respect to output, for the simulated series and the actual data. The main
message of this table is that the model does a good job at replicating the correlations of all the
variables, and the elasticities of most of them, although it underestimates the volatility of some
variables. Let us look at the simulation results in detail.
As we can see in Table 6, the model is capable of capturing the countercyclicality of unem-
ployment and the procyclicality of the share of formal employment well. The model is also able to
reproduce the correlations of the other variables in the data. Furthermore, the simulation results
show that the model quantitatively reproduces the behavior of accessions towards employment.
The job-ﬁnding rate from unemployment is strongly procyclical, and its elasticity is very close
to that observed in the data (3.65 compared to 3.93 in the data). Similarly, the job-ﬁnding rate
for informal jobs is much less volatile than its formal counterpart, and does not have a strong
cyclical pattern. Finally, the elasticity of the rate at which informal jobs are formalized, 1.22,
well matches that in the data, 1.72.
For the baseline parametrization, the model is not able to precisely capture the overall volatil-
ity of the economy. The parameter values in the baseline calibration are set to match the relative
volatility of the job separation rate for formal jobs. This, however, grossly underestimates the
elasticities of the job separation rate of informal jobs almost by a factor of three, -1.95 vs. -4.41.
Since the job separation rate for informal jobs is one of the main driving forces of cyclical unem-
ployment, this also implies that the elasticity of the unemployment rate is lower than in the data,
-3.26 compared to -4.46. On the other hand, the elasticity of the share of formal employment is
very close to actual one, which essentially happens because the model can correctly replicate the
accessions towards formality, both from unemployment and from informal jobs. As we show in
the sensitivity analysis of the results, it is possible to reconcile the model with the data in terms
of volatilities and elasticities using alternative parametrizations.
The intuition for the previous results, and the mechanisms at play in the model, are better
understood by analyzing the di erent thresholds in table 5. Let us look ﬁrst at the job separation
20Although not shown explicitly, the calibrated lower bound of the initial productivity distribution,  
G
min, is
higher than the threshold at which informal jobs are destroyed in any of the three aggregate states. This is
required to satisfy the assumption that all initial contacts between ﬁrms and workers result in match formation.
17rate and its negative correlation with output. An increase in productivity, p, reduces the job
separation rate for both types of jobs. This is captured in table 5 by the fact that the separation
thresholds in both formal and informal jobs fall with productivity. This is a standard result in
the literature since, as productivity increases, so does the proﬁtability of jobs, and hence the
threshold that makes the value of the job equal to zero also falls.
The second rate to analyze is that of ﬁnding a job, which should be divided between the
transition rate to formal and informal employment. The job-ﬁnding rate for formal jobs is
given by  q( )[1   G( R)]. This rate is characterized by two separate e ects. The ﬁrst is
the meeting e ect, which reﬂects the probability for a worker to meet a ﬁrm, and is governed
by  . The second is the o er e ect, which is the conditional probability of signing a formal
contract, [1 G( R)]. Table 5 suggests that a positive productivity shock increases  . This is the
traditional e ect captured in most search and matching models, which implies that an increase
in the proﬁtability of both formal and informal jobs fosters vacancy creation. Table 5 also
shows that a positive productivity shock lowers  R, which increases the conditional probability
of o ering a formal contract. This occurs because formal jobs can better take advantage of the
increase in productivity. Overall, the meeting e ect and the o er e ect reinforce each other,
producing an increase in the chances of an unemployed worker obtaining a formal job. This
generates the strong procyclicality of the job-ﬁnding rate for formal jobs in the model. Similarly,
the variation in the o er e ect is the driving force of the conversion of informal jobs into formal
ones. This job to job transition rate is procyclical both in the data and in the model, and its
elasticity with respect to output is weaker than those accessions from unemployment. The reason
is that, in this case, only one e ect (the o er e ect) is at work.21
The job-ﬁnding rate for informal jobs is given by  q( )G( R). Once more, it is useful to
separate the two e ects. In this case, the meeting e ect is as before, but the conditional proba-
bility of signing an informal contract, the o er e ect, is given by G( R). A positive productivity
shock increases the meeting rate, but lowers the informal job o er rate by lowering  R. The
overall impact on the informal job-ﬁnding rate depends on the properties of the distributions
G( ) and H( ). For the baseline parametrization, the model successfully reproduces the low
variability of the job-ﬁnding rate for informal jobs, but with the opposite sign. This indicates
that in our simulations, the o er e ect dominates the meeting e ect, which is not what seems
to occur in the data, since the correlation of output and the job-ﬁnding rate for informal jobs
is positive. Nevertheless, our results show that changes in the hiring behavior of the ﬁrm are a
likely candidate to explain the relative stability of the job-ﬁnding rate for informal jobs.
21In all, note that due to the o er e ect mechanism, we circumvent some of the problems experienced by Shimer
(2005) for the textbook Pissarides model. Shimer (2005) ﬁnds that in the basic model, where only the meeting
e ect is present, the model response of the job-ﬁnding rate to productivity shocks does not generate enough
volatility to match the data. In our model, the volatility of the job-ﬁnding rate for formal jobs is enhanced by the
o er e ect, which is also responsible for generating the lower volatility of the job-ﬁnding rate for informal jobs.
185.1 Sensitivity Analysis
We now explore the sensitivity of the previous simulation results to changes in the two main
parameters of the model: The income when unemployed, b; and the arrival rate of idiosyncratic
shocks to informal jobs,  i.22
As discussed earlier, b is an important determinant of the overall volatility of the model in
response to changes in productivity. This can be seen in Table 7, which presents the simulation
results under three values of b: 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8. Variations in b, leave the correlations with respect
to output virtually unchanged. However, as we increase b, the elasticity of the job separation rate
for informal jobs relative to output increases from -1.95 to -2.44. This is due to the fact that as b
increases, wages become less responsive to changes in productivity, and the model becomes more
volatile. This higher responsiveness of the model brings the elasticity of the unemployment rate
closer to the data, -3.99 when b =0 .8. Therefore, the results found elsewhere in the literature
concerning the increase in the volatility of the model when b increases, i.e. Shimer (2005) and
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), still apply to our framework. In fact, the maximum value of b
for which the model can compute an equilibrium is b =0 .9, and although we do not show the
results for the sake of brevity, we ﬁnd that the elasticity of unemployment with respect to output
is -4.20, very close to the -4.46 in the data.
We also explore the e ect of changes in  i in Table 8. As in the previous case, changes in  i
do not substantially alter the correlations of the model. We have argued before that the arrival
rate of shocks determines the elasticity of job separations in the model. This is precisely what
happens when we modify  i. If we decrease  i to 0.16, twice the rate of its formal counterpart,
we observe that the elasticity of the job separation rate for informal jobs drops substantially,
from -1.95 to -0.32, taking us further away from the empirical data.
Increasing  i produces much better results. When  i =0 .48, the elasticity of the separation
rate for informal jobs increases substantially, approaching that in the data, -3.78. Furthermore,
the model does a better job in replicating the elasticity of unemployment, -3.93, although still
falling short of the -4.46 in the data. It is possible to completely reconcile the elasticity of the
informal separation rate in the model with the data by allowing  i =0 .8, but in that case the
equilibrium implies that the penalty for ﬁrms if caught with informal workers necessarily be
negative. That is, ﬁrms would have to be compensated for hiring informal workers if subject to
so much volatility.
6 Policy Changes
The previous section analyzes the performance of the model for di erent parametrizations. We
now use the model, under the preferred parametrization (b =0 .6 and  i =0 .48), to assess the
22We have also explored changes in the productivity wedge,  , and the hiring cost, c, but modifying these
parameters does not produce signiﬁcant changes in the behaviour of the simulated variables. These results are
available from the authors upon request.
19e ects of several government policies on the di erent ﬂows and variables in the labor market. We
study the quantitative e ects of changes in ﬁve policies. Three of these policies directly constrain
formal jobs: ﬁring costs, F; hiring costs, c; and payroll taxes,  . The other two penalize informal
jobs: the informality monitoring rate by the government,  , and the penalty imposed to ﬁrms
if caught with informal workers,  . The results of these counter-factual policy experiments are
shown in Table 9. The main ﬁnding indicates that policies that increase the cost of formal
employment for the ﬁrm, or those that decrease the cost of informality, produce a reduction in
the share of formal employment and an increase in unemployment. The main reason is that these
policies reduce the accessions to formal employment, both from unemployment and from other
informal jobs, while increasing the ﬁnding rate for informal jobs. The e ect on the separation
rates for formal and informal jobs depends on each individual policy. We now analyze the e ects
of these policies in more detail. We explain ﬁrst the e ects of the formal market policies, and
then those for the informal market.
As expected, the three formal job policies directly inﬂuence the hiring decisions of the ﬁrm.
Increasing any of these three policy parameters reduces the job-ﬁnding rate for formal jobs, while
increasing the ﬁnding rate for informal employment. The drop in the formal employment ﬁnding
rate is due to the reduction in both the meeting and the o er e ects, that is, to the decrease in
the market tightness,  , and the decrease in the threshold at which jobs are formalized,  R. The
main di erence between the three policies is the impact on the job separation rate for formal jobs:
(i) An increase in the ﬁring costs reduces the job separation rate for formal jobs. This occurs
through two channels: A direct one, by making dismissals more costly; and an indirect one, by
diminishing the wage demands of workers, since their outside option then becomes less attractive
due to the lower ﬁnding rates. (ii) Increases in hiring costs, while also reducing the separation
rate for formal jobs, only a ect this rate through the indirect channel, implying that raising these
costs produces a smaller drop in the job separation rate for formal jobs. (iii) Contrary to the
previous two policies, payroll taxes increase the job separation rate for formal jobs. This is due
to the fact that raising taxes directly reduces the bargaining power of the ﬁrms (see Equation
(11)), which increases wage demands and raises the job separation rate for formal workers.
Overall, increases in these three policies produce an increase in unemployment and a decrease
in the share of formality. Under the baseline calibration, a separate 1% increase in F,   and
c produces increases in unemployment of 0.46%, 0.25%, and 0.01%, and a drop in the share of
formal employment of 0.84%, 0.34%, and 0.01%, respectively. The basic intuition is as follows.
Higher payroll taxes increase unemployment because they decrease the total job-ﬁnding rate
and increase the job separation rate for formal jobs, while producing minor reductions in the
job-ﬁnding rate for informal jobs. Firing and hiring costs generate less job creation, but also
less job destruction. Hence, the e ect on unemployment is generally ambiguous, although under
our parametrization the lower creation e ect dominates. Furthermore, in our model there is
an additional channel through which labor market policies a ect unemployment. Firing costs,
hiring costs, and taxes change the composition between formal and informal jobs in favor of the
20latter. This has non-neutral implications for unemployment, since the higher fraction of informal
jobs shifts the labor market from a low job separation rate sector to a high job separation rate
sector.
In terms of the informal sector policies, increasing the monitoring rate of informal jobs or
the penalty raises the job separation in this sector, while generating a reallocation of informal
workers into formal jobs. This policy also reduces the market tightness of the economy, which
lowers separation for formal jobs. The reallocation e ect seems to dominate, and despite the
increase in the separation rate for informal jobs, unemployment decreases. Numerically, a 1%
increase in the monitoring rate produces a drop in unemployment and informality of 0.01% and
0.03%, while raising the penalty of noncompliance decreases unemployment and by 0.03% and
increases formality 0.07%, respectively.
7 Conclusions
Informal labor markets in developing countries capture a large fraction of employment. In coun-
tries such as Brazil, 35% to 45% of the workers are employed in the underground economy, where
a lack of protection and regulations is the norm. Understanding the ﬂows of workers between
the formal and the informal sectors, as well as from unemployment, is crucial in studying the
e ects of policies in these countries.
In this paper, we present a set of stylized facts about the cyclical patterns of unemployment,
share of formality, and ﬂows of workers in Brazil for the 1980s and 1990s. We then build a
two-sector search and matching model of the labor market, which we calibrate and simulate to
assess its success in accounting for these empirical facts. We then employ the model to study
the e ects of policy changes on unemployment and the share of formality in the economy. The
model is characterized by the endogenous choice of ﬁrms to hire workers either legally or illegally,
the possibility for workers to transition from informality to formality after the job has started,
and the endogenous destruction of jobs. This paper shows that traditional search and matching
models are appropiate to capture the cyclical facts observed in worker ﬂow data. presented here
inelsewhereforcrucial that we know little of
We ﬁnd that the model does a fairly good job of reproducing the correlations and elasticities
with respect to output observed in the data, although a di erent parametrization from the
baseline is needed for the model to generate su cient volatility. In terms of policies, our results
highlight that regulations changing the relative incentives to participate in the formal sector
substantially a ect the allocation of workers among sectors, with non-neutral e ects on the
unemployment rate. We show that those policies that increase the cost of formality, or decrease
the cost of informality, reduce the share of formal employment, as expected. Furthermore, it is
these types of policies that tend to increase unemployment.
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24A Source and Description of Data
The data for Brazil are drawn from the Monthly Employment Survey (Pesquisa Mensual de
Emprego, PME) that conducts monthly household interviews in six of the major metropolitan
regions, covering 25% of the national labor market. The PME is structured so as to track each
household during four consecutive months and then drop them from the sample for 8 months,
after which they are reintroduced for another 4 months. The rotation procedure is such that each
month, one-fourth of the sample is substituted by other households to form a new panel. Thus,
after 4 months, the entire initial sample has been rotated and after 8 months, a third, di erent
sample is being surveyed. After 12 months, the initial sample is re-encountered. Over a period
of two years, three di erent panels of households are surveyed, and the process starts again with
three new panels. We have concatenated the panels from the January 1983 to December 2001.
Regrettably, the PME was drastically modiﬁed in 2002, and it is not possible to reconcile the
new and old deﬁnitions of unemployment. The monthly attrition rate in the PME is between
5% and 10% of the sample.
The measure of output is quarterly Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and is obtained from
the Brazilian Statistical Institute (IBGE). It is measured at constant prices of 1990.
Deﬁning Informality. Though, generally speaking, there is broad consensus in the litera-
ture as to what constitutes an informal worker, the study of transitions raises some particular
deﬁnitional complexity that we discuss here. Initially, we follow the International Labour Or-
ganization (ILO) in dividing employed workers into three sectors: informal salaried, informal
self-employed and formal sector workers. Broadly speaking, formal workers are those working in
ﬁrms licensed with the government and conforming to tax and labor laws, including minimum
wage directives, pension and health insurance beneﬁts for employees, workplace standards of
safety, etc. Informal workers (both salaried and self-employed), are those owners of ﬁrms that
are largely de-linked from state institutions and obligations, and those employees who are not
covered by formal labor protections. Employers in Brazil are obliged to register their employ-
ees by issuing them a working permit or “carteira de trabalho”, the signing of which guarantees
them access to formal labor protections. Those wage employees without a carteira are therefore
considered to be informal salaried.23 The second group classiﬁed as informal is the large number
of independent or self-employed workers (between 20% and 30% of the labor force). Brazil-
ian labor surveys enable the description of this micro-entrepreneurial sector by selecting those
self-employed workers who are not technicians or professionals.
We choose to pool together these two types of employment and focus on "informal em-
ployment" as a whole, based of the lack of protection criteria. Although these two types of
employment may have di erent considerations, they share very similar labor market dynamics.
Moreover, both constitute a very ﬂexible "unregulated" source of labor for formal ﬁrms.
23The selection criterion does not appear critical, as shown in Bosch and Maloney (2008).
25B Derivation of the Equilibrium Conditions
Given the free entry of ﬁrms, and the existence and uniqueness of  R,  df and  di shown through
Figure 2, we can rewrite equations (1) to (6) in the following way. The value of the di erent
states for the ﬁrm are:
k = q( )
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and for workers:
rU = b +  q( )
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Using (29) to (34) together with the sharing rules derived from the bargaining problem,
equations (10) to (12), we can obtain the wage functions for each of the three types of matches.
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The employee is compensated for his work with a fraction  , adjusted for taxes, of what
the ﬁrm gains by hiring him and a fraction (1    ) of what it loses for being in the match. By
employing the worker, the ﬁrm produces output, which makes the wages an increasing function
of the productivity of the match. Formal ﬁrms, when starting a new match, must pay the hiring
cost and eventually the ﬁring cost, both of which reduce the wage of the newly hired worker.
However, since once the match is formed the hiring cost is removed, and the ﬁring cost becomes
26active, the threat point of the worker increases and raises his wages. Informal wages are not
a ected by these costs, but depend negatively on the ﬁne paid by the ﬁrm if caught by the
government. All types of workers are also compensated for the ﬁrm’s saved search cost, k . The
part of the wage related to the loss due to being employed is the ﬂow value of unemployment, b,
and a measure of the value lost to taxes if not hired through an informal contract.
Using the wage equations, (35) to (37), into the value function of the ﬁlled ﬁrm, (30) and
(31), we obtain that the following conditions which are used to characterize the equilibrium:
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We can use the equilibrium condition equations (38) to (40), together with the wage equations
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Given the previous value functions and the equilibrium conditions, we can ﬁnd the equations
which determine the steady state equilibrium.
The ﬁrst condition is determined by the free entry of ﬁrms, which implies V =0and delivers
27the following equation
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The formal/informal threshold,  R, is determined through the condition Jn
f ( R) c = Ji ( R)
and given by
 R =
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we obtain the formal destruction threshold
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Similarly, using the condition for informal destruction, Ji ( )=0 , we ﬁnd the informal
destruction threshold
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Figure 2 illustrates the ﬁrm’s hiring and ﬁring decisions. This ﬁgure plots the value for
the ﬁrm of the di erent contracts against the level of idiosyncratic productivity of the match,
 . It is easy to show that the proﬁtability of occupied jobs is monotonically increasing on the
idiosyncratic productivity of the match, and therefore, Jn
f ( ) c, Jo
f ( )+F and Ji ( ) are upward-
sloping. However, the slope of the latter is smaller because of the overall productivity wedge,
 , the existence of monitoring,  , and the larger arrival rate of new idiosyncratic productivity
shocks,  i > f. As stated by the equilibrium condition (14), the formality/informality threshold,
 R, is found in the intersection of Jn
f ( ) c and Ji ( ). Similarly, using conditions (16) and (17),
 df and  di are obtained in the intersections of Ji ( ) and Jo
f ( )+F with the horizontal axis,
respectively. As explained before, we restrict our attention to the range of parameter values
where formal and informal jobs coexist, and formal ﬁrms do not ﬁnd it optimal to transform the
match into an informal one. Under these conditions,  R > di > df > 0.
28C Comparative Statics: Changes in Productivity
Here we present a comparative statics exercise for a simpler version of the steady state model
which does not include informal upgrading or payroll taxes. The equilibrium of this simpler
version of the model is composed of the same four variables,  ,  R,  df and  di, which satisfy the
following four equations:
• Free entry condition:
k
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• Formal-Informal reservation threshold:
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The remaining important variables of the model, u, nf, ni, share of formal employment, and
job-ﬁnding rates for formal and informal jobs are given by the following six equations:
u =




 q( )[1   G( R)]u
 fH( df)
, (53)





JFRf =  q( )[1   G( R)], (56)
JFRi =  q( )G( R). (57)
29Figure 3 illustrates the implication of an increase in productivity24, p.
An increase in the general productivity parameter shifts both job separation conditions down-
wards. Similarly, the formal/informal hiring condition also shifts these two conditions down-
wards, since now ﬁrms and workers have more incentives to sign formal contracts. This is
because formal jobs are better able to take advantage of the increases in productivity. Finally,
the free entry condition is shifted to the right as the expected proﬁt from both types of jobs
increases.
While from the graphs we can see that there is an unambiguous increase in market tightness
but an ambiguous impact on  R,  df and  di, it is easy to see that all three margins decrease.
This implies a higher conditional probability of signing formal contracts and lower job separation
thresholds in both types of jobs. The following propositions summarize the qualitative predictions
of the model.
Proposition 1 An increase in productivity, p, reduces the job separation rate in both types of
jobs.
This is immediate from ﬁgure 3(b). In response to a good productivity shock, both  df and
 di decrease. Hence, the job separation rate in both types of jobs,  fH( df) and  fH( di)+ ,
decrease. However, the model is silent with respect to which of these two probabilities decreases
more. This remains a quantitative question, which is addressed in the simulation section of the
paper.
Proposition 2 An increase in productivity, p, unambiguously increases the job-ﬁnding rate for
formal jobs, but it has an ambiguous e ect on the job-ﬁnding rate of informal jobs.
The job-ﬁnding rate for formal jobs is given by  q ( )[1   G( R)]. It is useful to separate
the rate of transition to employment into two e ects: The meeting e ect, which reﬂects the
probability that a worker meets a ﬁrm, and is governed by  ; and the o er e ect, which is the
conditional probability of signing a formal contract, [1   G( R)]. A positive productivity shock
increases   and reduces  R. Hence, the meeting e ect and the o er e ect reinforce each other,
which produces an increase in the chances for an unemployed worker to obtain a formal job.
This is consistent with the strong procyclicality of the job-ﬁnding rate for formal jobs found in
Brazil.
Similarly, the job-ﬁnding rate for informal jobs is given by  q( )G(R). In this case, the
conditional probability of signing an informal contract is given by G( R). A positive productivity
shock increases the meeting rate, but lowers  R. This last e ect lowers the conditional probability
of signing an informal contract. The exact e ect on the informal job-ﬁnding rate depends on the
properties of the distributions G( ) and H ( ). Nevertheless, this change in the hiring policy of
the ﬁrm provides a likely explanation for the relative stability of the job-ﬁnding rate for informal
jobs. We take up this issue in the numerical simulations of the model.
24Note that changes in the unemployment beneﬁts, b, are equivalent, but with opposite sign, to changes in
productivity.
30Proposition 3 An increase in productivity, p, unambiguously decreases unemployment, but it
has an ambiguous e ect on the share of formal employment.
The unemployment rate is determined by the exit rate from unemployment  q( ), the job
separation rate in each type of job, and the share of formal employment. A positive productivity
shock generates lower job separation rates in all jobs, increasing the rate of exit from unemploy-
ment. Therefore, in the face of a positive productivity shock, unemployment can only increase
if the share of formal employment falls. However, from equation (53) it is easy to see that, if
unemployment increases, so does the number of formal workers. Hence, it is not possible to have
a drop in the share of formality, since that would imply an increase in the number of informal
workers, which is incompatible with the fact that the labor force is constant. Unemployment
must, therefore, fall.
The share of formal employment should follow a procyclical pattern dictated by the hiring
decisions of the ﬁrm. However, the results here are also ambiguous, because quantitative changes
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 2: Unemployment Accounting Exercise








JJi f 0.05 0.82
JJf i -0.03 0.05
Notes: The table shows the contribution to cyclical unemployment and formality of each of the ﬂows among
employment states. Constructed with quarterly data from the National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU). JFR is
the job-ﬁnding rate, JSR is the job separation rate, JJ denotes direct job to job transitions, and the subscripts
f and i denote formal and informal respectively. This is computed as the covariance between the steady state
unemployment rate (share of formal employment), and the steady state unemployment rate (share of formal
employment) resulting of varying each of the six possible ﬂows, as a proportion of the variance of the steady state
unemployment rate (share of formal employment).
Table 4: Parameter Conﬁguration
Exogenous Parameters
r =0 .019 =0 .5   =0 .5 b =0 .6¯ p =1
  =0 .37 c =1 /90   =0 .81   =0 .005
G
max =1 H
max =1 f =0 .08 i =0 .32
Endogenous Parameters
  =1 F =1 .53   =8 .41 k =0 .63
G
min =  0.11 H
min =0 .59
Table 5: Results of the Endogenous variables
Parameters p =0 .95 p =1 p =1 .05
  0.93 1 1.08
R 0.88 0.87 0.86
di 0.23 0.22 0.20
df 0.44 0.43 0.42
33Table 6: Simulation Results: Changes in Productivity
Cross-corr. with y Volatility  x
 y Elasticity w.r.t y
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Data Model Data Model Data Model
u -0.83 -0.87 5.41 3.78 -4.46 -3.26
(0.05) (1.42) (1.18)
  0.49 0.37 0.49 0.41 0.24 0.20
(0.26) (0.15) (0.11)
JFRf 0.74 0.93 5.31 3.91 3.93 3.65
(0.04) (1.12) (1.10)
JFRi 0.24 -0.10 1.43 0.68 0.34 -0.03
(0.80) (0.07) (0.54)
JSRf -0.28 -0.58 3.54 3.55 -1.01 -2.26
(0.14) (2.40) (1.66)
JSRi -0.75 -0.81 5.95 2.38 -4.41 -1.95
(0.06) (0.40) (0.44)
JJi f 0.73 0.39 2.36 4.34 1.72 1.22
(0.17) (1.52) (0.76)
Notes: The table shows the correlation, volatility and elasticity with respect to output of the actual series
(Data) and the simulated series (Model). The simulated series are computed following the procedure described
in section 5. u is the unemployment rate,   is the share of formal employment, JFR is the job ﬁnding rate,
JSR is the job separation rate, JJ denotes direct job to job transitions, and the subscripts f and i denote
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 9: Policy Changes: Elasticities
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
F   c  
u 0.46 0.25 0.01 -0.03 -0.02
  -0.84 -0.33 -0.01 0.07 0.03
y -0.16 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.01
JFRf -2.22 -0.70 -0.02 0.14 0.06
JFRi 0.73 0.23 0.00 -0.06 -0.02
JSRf -0.31 0.06 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
JSRi -0.22 -0.08 -0.00 0.06 0.02
JJi f -2.06 -0.6 -0.01 0.14 0.06
Notes: The table shows the elasticity of the steady state value of the series with repect to the policy variables. u
is the unemployment rate,   is the share of formal employment, JFR is the job ﬁnding rate, JSR is the job
separation rate, JJ denotes direct job to job transitions, and the subscripts f and i denote formal and informal
respectively. F is the ﬁring cost,   is the payroll tax, c is the hiring cost, ,   is the monitoring rate and   is the
penalty of informality.
37Figure 1: Labor Market in Brazil: 1983-2001
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Notes: Series constructed using monthly data, quarterly averaged, from the Monthly Employment Survey (PME).
% For is the share of formal employment constructed as number of formal workers over total employment.
Unemployment rate (Unem. Rate) corresponds to number of unemployed workers over total labor force. Unm-
For and Unm-Inf correspond to the average probability of transiting from unemployment into formal and informal
employment respectively. For-Unm and Inf-Unm correspond to the average probability of transiting from formal
and informal employment into unemployment. For-Inf and Inf-For correspond to the average probability of
transiting between formal and informal employment.The series have been smoothed using a moving average ﬁlter
a with a three-quarter window.
38Figure 2: Steady State Equilibrium
(a) Equilibrium Thresholds
Job destruction and labor hoarding
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Figure 3: Increase in Productivity
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